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Abstract
A key policy argument in favor of emissions markets (relative to command-and-control types of
regulation) is their ability to aggregate dispersed information and generate price signals to guide
firms’ trading and abatement decisions. We investigate this argument in a multi-period model
where firms receive noisy private signals about their current period emissions and privately
observe their previous period emissions before this information is made public to the rest of
the market. Firms respond to information by trading and abating emissions. We show that
there exists a rational expectations equilibrium that fully aggregates firms’ private information,
justifying the policy argument in favor of emissions markets, in the absence of other frictions. We
also derive predictions about how prices should be reacting to new private or public information
and show that the possibility of abatement dampens the impact of shocks on prices. Finally,
we show that the information aggregation result breaks down if firms’ abatement costs are also
private information.∗
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A central argument in favor of market-based policy instruments (as opposed to command-and-
control policies) is their ability to decentralize decisions to those economic agents who have the
information. Translated in the context of emissions markets, this argument contends that profit
maximization by firms subject to the scheme, combined with competitive markets for allowances, will
generate the “right” price signal to guide abatement and trading decisions, ultimately minimizing
the costs of reducing emissions.
Montgomery (1972), Cronshaw and Kruse (1996), and Rubin (1996) have provided theoretical
foundations for this argument - a variant of the First Welfare Theorem - for emissions markets
without uncertainty. Yet, uncertainty is paramount in most emissions trading schemes. Business-
as-usual emissions are intrinsically uncertain. For example, emissions from the electricity sector are
highly dependent on the relative price of gas and coal, the business cycle, as well as on the weather.
Firms learn about their emissions over time as this uncertainty unfolds. In addition, different firms
have access to different abatement opportunities and these are typically privately known.
The presence of these sources of uncertainty - private information and exogenous risk - raises
two questions. First, can competitive emissions markets adequately aggregate private information,
a necessary condition for efficiency ? Second, what impact does uncertainty have on the welfare
properties of competitive emissions markets? The existing literature has partially answered the
second question in the context of exogenous risk (Schennach 2000; Seifert et al. 2008; Hitzemann
and Uhrig-Homburg 2018) but has not tackled the issue of information aggregation.
To answer these questions, we analyze a multi-period emissions trading model with both private
information and aggregate shocks. Our model builds on the canonical model in the literature
(Rubin 1996; Schennach 2000) with risk neutral price-taking firms in the allowances market, no
pass-through of costs, and short-term (instantaneous) abatement. Our main departure point is
to explicitly model firms’ sequential arrival of private information and public information releases,
and how these get aggregated into the equilibrium price. We assume the most favorable conditions
on the market to perform this role by using the dynamic rational expectations equilibrium (Tirole
1982) as our equilibrium concept. In a dynamic rational expectations equilibrium (REE), firms take
the price as given and use the information contained in the price, together with their own signals,
to decide on the best strategy to maximize their expected discounted profits, at every point in time.
There is no trading friction and a single price prevails.
We model a market with a finite horizon, by which firms need to surrender enough allowances
to cover their emissions to date, and where surplus allowances lose their values entirely at the end.
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The first phase (2005-2007) of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is a case in point, but
the model also captures markets with restrictions on the banking of unused allowances. To model
the gradual arrival of information to the market, we assume that the market is made of several
compliance periods. At the time when they decide on their abatement, firms receive a noisy signal
about their emissions during the current compliance period. They learn about their actual level of
emissions at the end of the compliance period and this information becomes public with a delay, at
the time emissions are verified.
We first consider an artificial economy where all private information is public and solve for the
equilibrium price and trading at all times when new information reaches the market. Because the
horizon is finite, we can solve the model by backward induction using standard dynamic program-
ming techniques. At all times, the equilibrium price is equal to the probability that the market is
short at the end of the horizon, times the penalty that firms must pay for failing to deliver enough
allowances to cover their emissions. The equilibrium price follows a martingale and converges to
zero or the penalty as the horizon gets closer and uncertainty about whether the market is long or
short decreases. The gradual arrival of information implies that the impact of exogenous shocks
to emissions spreads over two periods: at the beginning of the compliance period, when firms re-
ceive a noisy signal about their current period emissions, and at the beginning of the next period,
when they learn the realized emissions. Abatement endogenously dampens shocks to emissions as
they provide an alternative for firms to cover their emissions: when emissions are high, abatement
increases in reaction.
To prove that this full information equilibrium is an equilibrium when information is private,
we need to show that the equilibrium price fully aggregates private information, in the sense that
the equilibrium price is a sufficient statistic for the information dispersed in the economy and it
results in the same allocation as if each trader had access to all private information (Grossman
1976). The challenge here is that the equilibrium price, a one dimensional variable, is driven by
both the expectation and the variance of future emissions, net of abatement, i.e. a two dimensional
variable. We show that, when the only source of asymmetric information is private information
about emissions, prices can nevertheless be inverted to recover these parameters, i.e. prices are a
sufficient statistic. This implies that the full information equilibrium outcome is also the outcome
under rational expectations and dispersed information. This is no longer true when abatement costs
are also private information.
Relationship with the literature: Understanding the ability of markets to aggregate dis-
persed information has been a central question in finance since the seminal papers by Grossman
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(1976) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). This literature has shown that many factors can result in
prices not fully aggregating the underlying dispersed information even when traders are price-takers
(see Brunnermeier 2001 for a survey). Two features distinguish emissions markets from other asset
markets with dispersed information. First, the value of emissions allowances depends on the proba-
bility that the market is going to be short or long and it is the same for all traders, whereas traders
in asset markets may value the same piece of information differently based on their current positions
or risk attitudes. Second, the presence of abatement in emissions markets implies that prices today
endogenously affect the balance between the supply and demand of allowances tomorrow, whereas
shocks to the supply of assets are typically exogenous in finance. These two features – on top of less
fundamental modeling differences – set our paper apart from recent explorations about information
aggregation in dynamic markets (see e.g. He and Wang 1995; Vives 2011; and Cespa and Vives
2012). We will see that the first feature provides favorable conditions for information aggregation,
while the second complicates the inference problem because abatement endogenously affects both
the expected level of emissions and its variance, conditional on traders’ information.
In contrast to finance, the environmental economics literature has paid little attention to issues of
information aggregation. In fact, most theoretical analyses of emissions trading since Rubin (1996)
take the social planner’s perspective as their starting point, arguing e.g. as Schennach (2000) that
“[Rubin (1996) has shown that] when allowed to trade with one another, units will collectively behave
like a central planner who efficiently allocates emission permits to each unit to minimize total costs.”
Other recent examples of this social planner’s approach include Seifert et al. (2008) and Hintermann
(2010). Similarly, Chesney and Taschini (2012) solve for the informationally efficient equilibrium
emissions price in a model with private information but no abatement. Such approaches implicitly
assume that the equilibrium price will fully aggregate private information. Our results show that
this assumption is warranted when the only source of asymmetric information is private information
about emissions but that it is inconsistent with equilibrium behavior with dispersed information
when there is also private information about abatement costs.
Our analysis also generates new insights into the determinants of the dynamics of prices in
emissions markets. In particular, we go beyond the well-known result according to which emissions
prices are martingales and derive explicit forms for the way they get updated, following new infor-
mation arrival. In particular, when full information aggregation obtains, we show that prices should
not respond to the publication of verified emissions since that information was already (privately)
known to market participants. This is a special case of the strong form of the Efficient Market
Hypothesis.
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II A Benchmark Model of Price Formation
We explore price formation in a model designed to capture the salient features of many emissions
markets, namely gradual arrival of private information about own emissions, abatement, and un-
limited banking and borrowing of allowances within a phase. Figure 1 illustrates the timing of
allocation and surrender of emissions allowances in the EU ETS. Phases are made of several com-
pliance periods. Allocations for the whole phase are announced at the beginning of the phase but
allowances are distributed in yearly installments at the end of February of each year. Emissions
for year t are verified by March of year t + 1. Firms have then until April 30 to surrender the
allowances corresponding to the emissions of the previous year. This timing makes it possible for
firms to use some of the current year’s allowances to cover the previous year’s emissions. It is
arguably equivalent to full borrowing as one year of allowances is likely to provide the necessary
inter-temporal flexibility in most cases. Failure to surrender sufficient allowances results in a fine,
together with the requirement to buy any missing allowances in the market (from the next phase
if necessary). Unused allowances can be banked for future years. During Phase I of the EU ETS
(2005-07), allowances lost their value at the end of the phase. Banking across phases was allowed
starting with phase II (2008-12).
FIGURE 1. - Timing of Allocation and Surrender of Allowances in the EU ETS
Figure 1 also clarifies the timing of information available to the market. While firms could
arguably track their individual emissions as they happened, verified emissions for all installations
are only made public in April of the year after.1
1According to the Report on the functioning of the EU ETS (COM(2015) 576 final), most of the installations
covered by the EU ETS use the calculation-based methodology to monitor their emissions throughout the year. This
method weighs all emissions-producing inputs used by the installation by an emission factor to generate an estimate
of its emissions. Continuous emissions measurement systems are only used in a very small number of installations
5
We model the finite horizon version of this market. The market plays out over T + 1 periods.
In periods 1 to T , N firms emit carbon according to an i.i.d. exogenous stochastic process, eit
∼ N(µt, σ2), where µt and σ2 capture, respectively, the business cycle and firm heterogeneity.2 For
now, we assume that both µt and σ
2 are common knowledge but relax this assumption for µt in
section IV. The number of firms N is finite (otherwise there would not be any aggregate uncertainty
about future emissions) but sufficiently large to make the price-taking assumption reasonable and
some of our proofs will rely of N being large enough. We interpret eit as the emissions of firm i





τ=1 eτ denote aggregate emissions to date. Similarly, Eit =
∑t
τ=1 eiτ denote firm i’s
cumulative emissions to date.
To reflect the gradual arrival of information, we further divide each period t ≤ T into two
subperiods, one beginning at time t and the other beginning at time t + 0.5. Subperiods differ
in the information available to firms. At integer times t = 1, 2, ..., firms privately learn about
their emissions in the previous period, eit−1, and receive a noisy but unbiased signal xit about their
current period emissions, equal to xit = eit + εit, where εit is i.i.d. distributed according to N(0, 1).
At mid-period points, t = 2.5, 3.5, ..., emissions about the previous period are made public. Firms
do not receive any additional private information.
Trading takes place at the beginning of each subperiod. Let yit denote the number of allowances
traded by firm i at time t (where yit > 0 corresponds to a purchase and yit < 0 to a sale) and let pt
denote the price of allowances at time t. In addition, at the beginning of each (full) period, firms





with θi > 0, that differs across firms. For now, we assume that these costs are common knowledge







. As for emissions, we introduce notations at and At to denote period t and cumulative
aggregate abatement respectively, and Ait to denote firm i’s cumulative abatement to date.
Period T + 1 is a pure compliance period: there are no emissions nor abatement. Firms learn
about their emissions in period T , eiT , decide on their sales or purchases of allowances, yiT+1, and
surrender their allowances for compliance. The role of this last period is to provide an opportunity
for firms to buy the needed allowances to cover their net emissions from period 1 to period T. With
full borrowing and banking, there is no loss in generality in assuming that compliance only occurs
at time T + 1 (the end of the phase). If market participants fail to surrender enough allowances to
(140 installations in 2014).
2Alberola et al. (2008) analyze the empirical drivers of emissions in the EU ETS.
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cover their emissions, they are fined K per missing allowance.3
Figure 2 summarizes the timing of actions and information in the model.
FIGURE 2. - Timing of Information and Action
Firms are rational but, in the tradition of rational expectations models, they take prices as
given.4 Their objective is to minimize their expected total cost of compliance which is the sum of
incurred abatement costs, trading costs, and penalty if applicable,
∑T
t=1 c(ait, θi) +
∑T+1
t=1 ptyit +
max {0,K(EiT −AiT − YiT+1)} where the last term corresponds to the total penalty.5
3In practice, the penalty may depend on t because a firm that fails to surrender a number of allowances corre-
sponding to its emissions has to pay a fixed penalty and buy any missing allowance on the market. If there are enough
allowances in the market in period T + 1, cost-minimizing firms will always comply and have enough allowances to
cover their emissions (otherwise they pay the fixed penalty K plus the current price of allowances, pT+1). If the
market is short at time T + 1, firms that do not have enough allowances will need to pay the fixed penalty K plus
the expected allowance price in the next phase. As there is no banking or borrowing between phases, the prices in
the different phases are statistically disconnected and therefore the fact that the penalty may depend on t (because
of the expected price in the next phase) does not affect our results.
4The Rational Expectations Equilibrium concept has well-known limitations (Grossman 1976; Dubey et al. 1987;
Jackson 1991) but has also shown to be a useful empirical benchmark (Plott and Sunder 1988; Forsythe and Lundholm
1990). We use it as an idealized form of frictionless market (see also Kovalenkov and Vives 2014).
5We ignore discounting for simplicity. We also ignore any indirect effect of the market for allowances on the markets
that firms serve (no pass-through).
7
Since there are only 2T + 1 moments of time when new information arrives or actions are taken,
we solve for the market equilibrium at these 2T + 1 moments. Let sit denote the vector of private
signals received at time t by trader i. At integer times, sit = (xit, eit−1), while at mid-period points,
sit+0.5 = (et−1). A fully dynamic Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) (Tirole 1982)
is a sequence of price functions mapping firms’ signals st = (s1t, s2t, ..., sNt) (and, implicitly, past
history of prices and own actions) into a price st → pt = gt(st) and a sequence of trades yit(sit, pt)
and abatement decisions ait(sit, pt) such that (i) each trader i minimizes his expected total cost
of compliance at all t and for all information (sit, pt) trader i may have, and (ii) markets clear∑
i yit(sit, pt) = 0 for all t, sit and pt.
The existence of a fully dynamic REE does not necessarily imply that prices fully aggregate
private information. This would be the case only if the price is a sufficient statistic for the private
and public information dispersed in the market (Grossman 1976). In other words, when the market
equilibrium fully aggregates private information, observing the equilibrium price leads to the same
market outcomes as if all participants pooled their private signals.
III Equilibrium
III.1 Full Information Equilibrium
We start by considering the equivalent artificial economy where all private information is public.6
Let It denote all the information available at time t in the economy, including all past prices,
emissions, and signals. Formally:
It = {p1, ... , pt, e1, ..., et−1, x1, ..., xt}
where we have innocuously summarized individual past emissions, abatement and signals through
their aggregates. Because, in that economy, no new information is revealed at mid-period times
(past emissions are already known at the beginning of the period), it is sufficient to solve for the
equilibrium at integer times. We do this using backward induction.
At time T+1, emissions and abatements are fixed and known so there are only two possibilities:
the market is short, i.e. cumulative aggregate emissions are higher than cumulative abatement
ET > AT , in which case pT+1 = K, the penalty, or ET ≤ AT , in which case pT+1 = 0. Firm i will
need to buy allowances at that price if its cumulative abatement and purchases do not cover its
cumulative emissions, EiT −AiT −YiT > 0 (where we have implicitly assumed that no trading takes
place at T + 0.5 since no new information reaches the market) and will sell allowances otherwise.
6This corresponds to Radner (1979)’s notion of full communication equilibrium.
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At time T, period T−1 aggregate emissions are revealed but only a noisy signal, xT , is available
for period T emissions. Based on this information, firms decide on their trading and abatement to
minimize their current and future expected costs of compliance:
minaiT ,yiT pT yiT + c(aiT , θi) + V
i
T+1(aiT , yiT |IT )
where V iT+1(aiT1, yiT |IT ) is firm i’s expected continuation cost of compliance at time T + 1 given
choices aiT and yiT , and information IT . Substituting for V
i
T+1(aiT , yiT |IT ) into this expression
leads to:
minaiT ,yiT pT yiT + c(aiT , θi) + E[pT+1(EiT −AiT − YiT−1 − yiT )|IT ]
Together with market clearing,
∑
i yiT = 0, and the fact that firms share the same beliefs about pT+1
since they have the same information, the first order conditions for firms’ individual optimization
problem are given by
ca(aiT , θi) = θiaiT = E[pT+1|IT ]
pT = E[pT+1|IT ]
[1]
At the full information equilibrium at time T, we find the classic result that firms choose to abate
up to the point where marginal abatement costs are equal to the current price.
Define Z = ET − AT , the excess emissions by the end of the phase. From the perspective of
time t, Z is a random variable, with:







where a tilda has been added on the values of emissions and abatement that are not known with
certainty at time t. With this definition, the expectation of pT+1 conditional on the information
available at time T can be written as:
E[pT+1|IT ] = K Pr(Z > 0|IT )
= K Pr(e˜T > AT−1 + aT − ET−1|IT ) [3]
where the terms on the righthand side of the inequality sign in (3) are either known at time T (AT−1
and ET−1) or are contemporaneously determined (aT ), whereas the term on the lefthand side is
a random variable, based on IT . Using the projection theorem for normally distributed variables






). Therefore, combining (1) and (3) implies
that the equilibrium price at time T is defined implicitly by the following equality:7
7This expression uniquely pins down pT : the LHS is increasing in pT , whereas the RHS is decreasing in pT .
Moreover, both sides are continuous and the LHS is lower than the RHS for low values of pT and higher for high








where Φ stands for the cumulative distribution function of the standardized normal or, equivalently,









Equation (4) shows that the equilibrium price increases with cumulative past emissions (ET−1)





xT ) and it decreases in past and
current abatement (AT−1 + pTθ ). Uncertainty about emissions, σ
2, has an ambiguous effect on
prices. On the one hand, the variance of Z increases in σ2. The effect on price depends on the sign
of expected excess emissions, E(Z|IT ). If E(Z|IT ) < 0, i.e. the market is expected to be long at
time T + 1, an increase in σ2 will increase the price because it increases the probability that the
market becomes short at T + 1. The effect is opposite if E(Z|IT ) > 0. On the other hand, a higher
level of uncertainty also means that firms put more weight on signal xT when updating their prior
about period T emissions. This can either contribute towards increasing prices (if xT is larger than
NµT ) or decreasing prices (otherwise) by changing E(Z|IT ). These effects reinforce one another if
the market is expected to be long but emissions in the current period are expected to be higher than
expected (xT > NµT ) or, alternatively, if the market is expected to be short and current period
emissions are expected to be lower than NµT .
Finally, note that the numerator in (4) scales proportionally with the number of firms N ,
whereas its denominator only scales at the rate of
√
N. This implies that the price converges to K
or 0 (depending on the sign of the numerator) as the number of firms increases. Intuitively, as the
number of firms increases, aggregate uncertainty about net emissions decreases and the market is
either long or short.
For future reference, it is useful to examine how the price at time T responds to the new
information reaching the market at time T , namely xT and eT−1. Let fT (.) describe the function
implicitly defined by (4) that maps xT and eT−1 into pT . Linearizing fT around the expectation of its





fT (NµT , E[eT−1 | IT−1]) +∇fT (NµT , E[eT−1 | IT−1])
 xT−NµT
eT−1 − E[eT−1 | IT−1]
 [6]
In words: relative to its expectation from the perspective of period T −1, the price at time T reacts
to higher than expected signals about current emissions, xT−NµT , and to higher past emissions
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than previously foreseen, eT−1 −E[eT−1 | IT−1]. In Lemma 1, we show that the multiplier of these
surprises is positive and that it is smaller for surprises about current emissions because firms account
for the fact that xT is a noisy signal and therefore only partially update their beliefs about current
period emissions. Lemma 1 also shows that the presence of abatement, which manifests it-self in
the presence of pTθ in the righthand side of (4) lowers the magnitude of these price adjustments:
abatement dampens shocks. All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 (Price adjustment to new information at time T). Let fT (.) describe the function
implicitly defined by (4) that maps xT and eT−1 into pT . Then:
(i) Prices respond positively to shocks in emissions and the more so to realized emissions than to




∂eT−1 fT (xT , eT−1) > 0.
(ii) The possibility of abatement dampens the price response to emissions shocks: ∂∂xT fT (xT , eT−1) <
∂
∂xT
f˜T (xT , eT−1) and ∂∂eT−1 fT (xT , eT−1) <
∂
∂eT−1 f˜T (xT , eT−1) where f˜(xT , eT−1) is the anal-
ogous price function in an environment without abatement, evaluated at the same value of
excess emissions Z.
(iii) Abatement only partially adjusts to emissions shocks so that the net effect of a positive (nega-
tive) emissions shock remains positive (negative): ∂∂xT E[eT − aT |IT ], ∂∂eT−1E[eT−1− aT |IT ] ∈
(0, 1).
Moving to time T − 1, firm i’s optimization problem is given by:
minaiT−1,yiT−1 pT−1yiT−1 + c(aiT−1, θi) + V
i
T (aiT−1, yiT−1|IT−1)
or, equivalently, substituting for the expected continuation cost and leveraging the law of iterated
expectations and the equilibrium at time T which imply that E[pT |IT−1] = E[pT+1 |IT−1]:
minaiT−1,yiT−1 pT−1yiT−1 + c(aiT−1, θi) + E[c(aiT , θi) + pT+1(EiT −AiT − YiT−1)|IT−1]
Market clearing and common information (and therefore beliefs) lead to the familiar first order
conditions for firms’ individual optimization problem :
ca(aiT−1, θi) = θiaiT−1 = E[pT+1|IT−1]
pT−1 = E[pT+1|IT−1]
[7]
As before, abatements equalize marginal costs with the current price of allowances. The difference is
that firms now need to form expectations both about future emissions and about future abatement.
Indeed, E[pT+1|IT−1] is now given by:
K Pr(Z > 0|IT−1) = K Pr(ET−2 −AT−1 + e˜T−1 + e˜T − a˜T > 0|IT−1)
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where we have again used a tilda to highlight unknown variables from the perspective of T − 1.




θ . However, pT is not known at time T − 1 but a function
of random variables xT and eT−1, fT (xT , eT−1). Using the linearization (6) of fT (.) around the
expectation of its arguments given IT−1, Z|IT−1 can be approximated by the sum of independent
normal variables, and thus a normal variable it-self, with mean and variance given in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 (Distribution of excess emissions as of time T-1). Z|IT−1 is distributed approxi-
mately normally with the following mean and variance
E[Z|IT−1] = ET−2 + 11+σ2NµT−1 + σ
2
1+σ2
xT−1 +NµT −AT−2 − 2pT−1θ
V (Z|IT−1) = Nσ2(1+σ2) + δTNσ2
with δT =
(














Here again, we see that abatement changes the dynamics of excess emissions, Z, as information
received at time T − 1 impacts both the expected excess emissions and its variance (through φT ), a
property absent in models without abatement (Chesney and Taschini 2012) and in finance models
that rely on normally distributed noises. The reason is that abatement is an endogenous response
to shocks.
The expression for the variance in Lemma 2 captures the net contribution of emission shocks
at time T − 1 , Nσ2
(1+σ2)
(since aT−1 is contemporaneously determined it does not contribute noise to
Z|IT−1), and the contribution from future shocks at time T, δTNσ2.
Remember that Nσ2 corresponds to the variance of emissions in period T , absent abatement.
Therefore, δT can be viewed as the dampening due to abatement. Looking at the expression for δT in
Lemma 2, it is easy to see that it is decreasing in K and increasing in θ. A higher penalty increases
abatement by increasing the expected price everything else equal. This reduces the net effect of
emission shocks, reducing the variance. On the other hand, an increase in θ means that abatement
is getting more expensive, which reduces firms’ adjustment to emissions shocks, everything else
equal.
The level of dampening also depends on the current value of excess net emissions (through φT ).
It is maximal when E(Z|IT−1) = 0 and minimal (i.e. δT converges to 1) when E[Z|IT−1] is either
very large or very low. The reason is that the level of excess net emissions influences the returns
to abatement. When excess net emissions are very large, the price is close to its ceiling, K. In
that case, the marginal benefit of abatement is limited because it will not change the probability
that the market is short very much. Likewise, when net emissions are very small (large in absolute
value but negative), the equilibrium price is close to its floor, zero. Again the marginal benefit of
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abatement is small. Instead, the marginal returns from abatement is high when E(Z|IT−1) is close
to zero, which explains that these are also circumstances where dampening is at its highest level.









where pT−1 appears both on the left of this equation but also on the right, in E[Z|IT−1]. We show in
the Appendix that (8) uniquely pins down the equilibrium price at T −1. The intuition is similar to
period T , namely that the righthand side, i.e. the probability of being short at the end of the phase,
is decreasing with pT−1 because abatement increases with pT−1. The difference with period T is
that V (Z|IT−1) also changes with pT−1. The proof shows that the direct effect through abatement
is larger than the indirect effect through a change in variance.
Lemma 3 (Uniqueness of the full information price equilibrium at time T − 1). The full
information equilibrium price implicitly defined by (8) is unique for N large enough.
We can replicate this approach for T − 2 and before, leading to Theorem 1:
Theorem 1 (Full information equilibrium). For N large enough, the full information equilib-








for all t = 1, ..., T [9]
with















)2 |It]Nσ2 for t ≤ T − 1
Nσ2
1+σ2
for t = T
[11]
where ∂fk∂ek−1 is shorthand notation for
∂
∂ek−1 fk(Nµk, E [ek−1|Ik−1]) .
At all times, in equilibrium, firms equate marginal abatement cost to the price and are indifferent
between trading today or later. Equilibrium prices follow a martingale E[pt|It−1] = pt−1.
Theorem 1 shows that the equilibrium price takes the same form at all times. It is equal to the
expected penalty at time T + 1, which depends on the level of penalty, K, and the probability that
emissions exceed the target. The expression for expected excess emissions, E(Z|It), consists of the
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k=t+1Nµk, minus past, current and future abatement, where the term
(T−t+1)
θ pt captures
the fact that firms expect to abate exactly the same amount per period going forward since pt is
the best forecast of future prices (intertemporal smoothing given that abatement costs are convex).
The expression for the variance accounts for the dampening of future shocks through abatement.
Corollary 1 derives the law of motion for expected excess emissions and formalizes the extent to
which uncertainty about the eventual balance between emissions and abatement decreases as time
goes by.
Corollary 1 (Dynamics of excess emissions). Expected excess emissions take the following
recursive form:










Their expected variance declines over time:
E [V (Z|It+1)|It] = V (Z|It)−Nσ2
(





Expression (12) shows that beliefs about expected excess emissions are updated following arrival
of new information about current period emissions (xt−Nµt) and previous period emissions (et−1−
E[et−1|It−1]), as well as changes in prices which lead market participants to update their beliefs
about future abatements.
Corollary 1 shows that the variance of excess emissions only decreases in expectation. It even-
tually does decrease as expected given that uncertainty reduces over time.8 Equilibrium prices
therefore eventually converge to 0 or K.
Finally, though equilibrium prices are not linear in signals, we can derive an approximate lin-
ear recursive form for them that highlights their martingale property and the nature of updating
following new information arrival. Corollary 2 generalizes (6).
Corollary 2 (Approximate dynamics of equilibrium prices). Equilibrium prices follow ap-
proximately the following recursive form:
pt = pt−1 +∇ft(Nµt, E[et−1|xt−1])
 xt −Nµt
et−1 − E [et−1|xt−1]






8To see this, compare the expressions for V (Z|IT ) in (4) and V (Z|IT−1) in Lemma 2
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III.2 Information Aggregation
We now turn to the equilibrium in the economy with private information. Let Iit denote firm i’s
information set at time t. Formally,
Iit = {p1, ... , pt, e1, ..., et−2, eit−1, xi1, ..., xit} for integer values of t
The next theorem shows that the full information equilibrium price is a sufficient statistic for market
participants’ private information. Therefore, the full information equilibrium is also an equilibrium
in the economy with private information. Because the full information equilibrium is unique, so is
the REE that fully aggregates private information.9
Theorem 2 (Full information aggregation). There exists a unique dynamic Rational Expecta-
tions Equilibrium that fully aggregates market participants’ private information. This equilibrium is
characterized at integer times by the same equations (9) - (11) as the full information equilibrium.
Moreover, pt = pt+0.5 : prices are not affected by the publication of aggregate emissions at mid-period
points because this information has already been integrated into the price.
Theorem 2 shows that the strong form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis holds in our setting:
all information – private and public – is integrated into the price as soon as it arises. This result
is remarkable because, a priori, two parameters are needed to identify the distribution of excess
emissions (E[Z|It] and V (Z|It)) and there is only one price. The technical reason why the price is
nevertheless a sufficient statistic for the information dispersed in the economy is the combination
of two factors: first, the price reveals E[Z|It]√
V (Z|It)
(this is seen in (9)), second, V (Z|It) is a known
function of E[Z|It] and the ratio E[Z|It]√
V (Z|It)
is strictly increasing in E[Z|It]. Together, these elements
imply that E[Z|It] and V (Z|It) can be identified separately.
Economically, this comes from the fact that all incentives are eventually driven by E[Z|It] only.
In particular, the marginal returns from abatement depend on the market expectation about excess
emissions, E[Z|It], which in turn impacts the level of dampening of emissions shocks, and therefore
V (Z|It). This reduces the information to infer to a single dimensional variable, and the equilibrium
price is therefore able to perform its information aggregation role.
We now examine the welfare properties of the rational expectations equilibrium. Montgomery
(1972), Cronshaw and Kruse (1996), and Rubin (1996) have shown theoretically that competitive
emissions markets with no uncertainty minimize aggregate compliance costs: individual optimiza-
tion by firms results in a total compliance cost that is equivalent to the aggregate least-cost solution,
9This does not rule out other – non full information aggregating – REE (see e.g. Pa´lvo¨lgyi and Venter 2015 for a
recent contribution to these questions).
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a corollary of the First Welfare Theorem. Theorem 3 shows that, when full information aggregation
takes place at equilibrium, this result generalizes to a market with private information and uncer-
tainty, with the caveat that the welfare criterion now is expected least-cost solution conditional on
all the information in the economy (constrained efficiency).
Theorem 3 (Constrained efficiency of the Rational Expectations Equilibrium). When full
information aggregation occurs, equilibrium decentralized abatement decisions minimize the expected
sum of current and future abatement costs at all times, conditional on the information available in
the economy.
As Kling and Rubin (1997) have noted before, the least cost solution may not be the solution
that maximizes social welfare if firms discount future payoffs differently from Society, if social costs
of emissions differ over time, or if the number of allowances is set suboptimally. These caveats also
apply here. In particular, K may differ from the marginal social cost of emissions beyond the initial
target but the market minimizes compliance cost, including this penalty.
IV Aggregate Uncertainty about Emissions
So far, the only source of uncertainty in the model was private information about past and current
emissions. In particular, the average difference between business-as-usual emissions and allowances,
µt, was common knowledge. This is a strong assumption for at least two reasons. First, in the
context of the launch of the EU ETS, business-as-usual emissions were hastily computed before
phase I and allowances allocations decided on this basis. Ex-post, it turned out that some of these
business-as-usual emissions were over-estimated. Second, µt can be interpreted as capturing the
business cycle, with high values of µt during booms and low values during recessions. While it may
be reasonable that the current business cycle is observable and common knowledge, business cycles
are intrinsically uncertain and therefore future µt’s are unlikely to be known with certainty today.
In this section, we explore two polar cases that relax the assumption that µt is common knowl-
edge and capture these sources of uncertainty:
Case 1: Unknown business-as-usual emissions. Suppose that individual emissions are still
drawn from a normal distribution N(µt, σ
2) as earlier, but now µt = µ for all t and
unknown to firms which hold a common prior N(µ0, τ
2
0 ) about µ.
Case 2: Uncertain future business cycle. Suppose that individual emissions are still drawn
from a normal distribution N(µt, σ
2) as earlier, but now µt is only observed at time
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t. Future average emissions are not known but correlated over time. They follow the
process µt+1 = µt + ρηt where ηt is i.i.d. N(0, 1) and ρ is common knowledge.
We first discuss how these alternative assumptions affect the full information equilibrium. Under
case 1, firms now not only learn about their past and current emissions at every period (and this
information is shared), they also update their beliefs about µ. The following lemma describes how
beliefs about µ and therefore beliefs about eit are updated.
Lemma 4 (Updated beliefs about µ and future emissions under case 1). Suppose that case
1 holds. In the full information economy, firms’ posterior beliefs at time t about average emissions
























where ∆ = τ2t−1(1 + 2σ2) +
σ2(1+σ2)
N . Posterior beliefs at time t about current and future individual
emissions are normally distributed according to N(µk, σ
2




for k > t.
Lemma 4 shows that, every period, firms update their beliefs about current and future emissions,
following their learning about past emissions {e1t−1, ..., eNt−1} and current emissions {x1t, ..., xNt}.
They put more weight on their prior when realized emissions are noisy (σ2 large) and their prior
precise (τ2t−1 small). As time passes, their posterior about µ becomes increasingly precise (τ2t
decreases with t). Firms have the same prior about all future emissions.
Under case 2, firms observe the existing business cycle (and therefore learn about the current
value of µt). They update their beliefs about future business cycles accordingly:
Lemma 5 (Updated beliefs about future emissions under case 2). Suppose that case 2 holds.
Posterior beliefs at time t about future individual emissions are normally distributed according to
N(µk, σ
2
k) with µk = µt and σ
2
k = (k − t)ρ2 + σ2 for k > t.
Lemma 5 shows that firms’ best prediction about average individual emissions is the same for all
future periods but become less precise as the time horizon increases. Future emissions are positively
correlated.
Looking back at how we derived the full information equilibrium in the benchmark model, it
is easy to see that the full information equilibrium in these richer informational environments is
characterized by the same equations as in Theorem 1 except that, at time t, the values for {µk}k≥t
and σ2 used to compute E[Z|It] and V (Z|It) are now replaced by the values {µk}k≥t and {σ2k}k≥t
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described in Lemma 4 or Lemma 5, whichever applies. Importantly, in both cases, V (Z|It) is still a
known function of E(Z|It) and common knowledge parameters K, θ, N , T , σ2 and now µ0, τ20 and
ρ (cf. intermediate step in the proof of Theorem 1). Thus, the argument for why prices separately
identify E[Z|It] and V (Z|It) in Theorem 2 still goes through and full information aggregation
obtains.
Theorem 4 (Full information aggregation when µt is not common knowledge). Consider
the extension of the benchmark model where either business-as-usual emissions are unknown (case
1) or future business cycles are uncertain (case 2). There exists a unique dynamic Rational Expec-
tation Equilibrium that fully aggregates market participants’ private information. This equilibrium
is characterized at integer times by the same equations (9) - (11) as the full information equilib-
rium, with the difference that, at time t, the values for {µk}k≥t and σ2 used to compute E[Z|It]
and V (Z|It) are now replaced by the values {µk}k≥t and {σ2k}k≥t described in Lemma 4 (case 1)
or Lemma 5 (case 2). Moreover, pt = pt+0.5 : price are not affected by the publication of aggregate
emissions at mid-period points because this information has already been integrated into the price.
Theorem 4 shows that the information aggregation result derived in the context of the bench-
mark model is robust to extensions to richer informational environments about the determinants of
emissions.
V When Information Aggregation Fails
Another relevant source of private information in practice is abatement costs. These were assumed
to be common knowledge in the benchmark model but are unlikely to be common knowledge in
practice, especially in markets covering firms from multiple industries as is the case of the EU ETS.
To explore the impact of information asymmetries about abatement costs, we return to the
benchmark model but now let firms’ abatement cost parameters (θ1, ..., θN ) be private information,
with some common prior over the joint distribution. This does not change the full information
equilibrium which is still given by Theorem 1. However, now V (Z|It) is no longer a known function
of E[Z|It]. This is already seen in period T − 1 where V (Z|IT−1) = Nσ2(1+σ2) + δTNσ2 where δT is
defined in Lemma 2 and depends on both θ and E[Z|IT−1]. Therefore, whereas pt may still reveal
E[Z|It]√
V (Z|It)
, market participants are unable to separately identify E[Z|It] and V (Z|It). As a result,
full information aggregation at integer times fails. For the same reason, the publication of past
emissions at mid-period does not help re-establish information aggregation, even if prices may react
to such publication. This is formalized in the next Theorem whose proof is omitted.
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Theorem 5 (Failure of information aggregation when abatement costs are private infor-
mation). When both emissions and abatement costs are private information, equilibrium prices can
no longer fully aggregate private information. The strong form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis
fails.
Theorem 5 establishes that the full information equilibrium, or equivalently, the informed social
planner approach to emissions markets is not appropriate when there is asymmetric information
about abatement costs. Intuitively, a low price can be the result of either lower emissions than
anticipated or low abatement costs. Low emissions and low abatement costs should also impact
future beliefs differently but firms have no way to tell from the price which event applies.
VI Concluding Comments
A central argument in favor of market-based policy instruments such as emissions markets is their
ability to decentralize decisions to those who have the information, thereby arguably fostering
greater efficiency. Our paper examined this argument, using tools from finance to model explicitly
the nature of information asymmetry and uncertainty in such markets.
We have found that markets can fully aggregate private information and generate informative
prices if the source of informational asymmetry is due to firms’ emissions. For the optimist, these re-
sults – especially Theorems 2-4 – can be seen as providing microfoundations – under some conditions
– for the social planner approach to emissions markets.
In our view, however, a more suitable take-away from the analysis is that information aggregation
is difficult to obtain. Despite the extremely favorable modeling assumptions that we have adopted
(no friction beyond asymmetric information, a single price, etc.), information aggregation breaks
down as soon as there is some information asymmetry regarding abatement costs. Even when
abatement costs are common knowledge, the inference problem – from prices to a sufficient statistic
about market participants’ information – is highly complex and non linear, raising doubts that real
markets could solve it. The fact that market participants in the EU ETS closely watch the yearly
publication of past realized emissions and that prices react to this is evidence that information
aggregation probably fails in this market.
An interesting venue for future research is to understand what competitive emissions markets
can realistically achieve when there is private information about abatement costs and, in particular,
how market design can support the information aggregation process. Another important open
question is to understand the efficiency implications for emissions prices as an investment signal in
these markets, when information aggregation fails.
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Proof of Lemma 1. (i) Applying the implicit function theorem on (4) yields
∂
∂eT−1


















where φ1 = φ























fT (xT , eT−1),
proving the first part of the claim.
(ii) In the absence of abatement, pT does not appear on the righthand side of (4), leading to simple



















The second claim follows directly from the comparison between the expressions of ∂∂xT fT (xT , eT−1)
and ∂∂xT f˜T (xT , eT−1), and
∂
∂eT−1 fT (xT , eT−1) and
∂
∂eT−1 f˜T (xT , eT−1) respectively when φ1 = φ2.
(iii) From the first order conditions for abatement (1), aT =
1


































Proof of Lemma 2. By definition, Z = ET−2 − AT−1 + e˜T−1 + e˜T − a˜T , where the variables
highlighted with a tilda are unknown as of time T − 1. Aggregate emissions e˜T−1 and e˜T are
independently distributed, conditional on IT−1, with
e˜T | IT−1 ∼ N(NµT , Nσ2)
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and











Aggregate abatement a˜T can be expressed as a function of the unknown variables (as of time T −1),
eT−1 and xT ,
fT (xT ,eT−1)
θ , where fT is the function defined implicitly by (4) that maps eT−1 and xT
into pT . Linearising fT around the expectations of its arguments, conditional on IT−1, implies that




ET−2 −AT−1 + eT−1 + eT − fT (xT , eT−1)θ
)
|IT−1








eT − 1θ ∂fT∂xT εT








where ∂fT∂eT−1 is shorthand notation for
∂




for ∂∂xT fT (NµT , E[eT−1 | xT−1]) derived in Lemma 1. Therefore Z|IT−1 is approximately normally
distributed with mean:




−1θfT (NµT , E[eT−1 | xT−1])




where we have used the fact that fT (NµT , E[eT−1 | xT−1]) = E[pT |IT−1] = pT−1 by the law of
iterated expectations. The variance of Z|IT−1 can be derived using the law of total variance:































































where the second and third lines use the expression for E [Z|IT ] and the linearization of pT as a




∂eT−1 ) and the fact that V (eT−1|IT−1) = V (eT−1|xT−1) = Nσ
2
1+σ2
. The last line follows from the
expression for ∂fT∂eT−1 derived in the proof of Lemma 1.
10This is the delta method in econometrics (see Greene 2011): by using a first-order Taylor series expansion around
the conditional means of its arguments, xT and eT−1, the non linear function fT can be approximated by a linear
function that takes normally distributed values if xT and eT−1 are normally distributed.
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Proof of Lemma 3. Given that the lefthand side of (8) is strictly increasing in pT−1, that both
sides are continuous and that the lefthand side is smaller than the righthand side at pT−1 = 0, a
sufficient condition for (8) to admit a unique solution is that
E(Z|IT−1)√
V (Z|IT−1)
is decreasing in pT−1. Let
wT−1 = E[Z|IT−1]. Using Lemma 2, we can write V (Z|IT−1) as a function of wT−1:
hT−1(wT−1) ≡ V (Z|IT−1) = Nσ
2
1 + σ2
+ δT (wT−1)Nσ2 [14]
















































we see that a necessary and sufficient condition for
E(Z|IT−1)√
V (Z|IT−1)






Substituting for hT−1(.) and h
′
T−1(.) using (14) and dividing by Nσ
2, this is equivalent to:
1
1 + σ2




T (wT−1)wT−1 > 0 [15]
The strategy of the proof is to show that (15) holds for N large enough. We do this by showing
that limN→∞δT (wT−1) = 1 and limN→∞δ
′
T (wT−1)wT−1 = 0.
Claim 1: limN→∞δT (wT−1) = 1



















Claim 2: limN→∞ 12δ
′








































N converges to a finite number (wT−1 scales with N) and limx→±∞φ
′
(x) = 0.













Continuity then implies that this inequality also holds for N large enough.
Proof of Theorem 1. It is easy to check that the solution for the equilibrium price at time T and
T − 1 satisfies (9) to (11). To prove that Theorem 1 holds for t < T − 1, we first show by induction
that pt = E[pT+1|It] for all t. This clearly holds for t = T, T − 1. Suppose it holds for k + 1 and
above, and consider the optimization problem of market participant i at time k:
minaik,yikpkyik + c(aik, θi) + V
i
k+1(aik, θi|Ik)
Using the fact that pt = E[pT+1|It] for t > k and the law of iterated expectations, this optimization
problem can be rewritten as:




c(ail, θi) + pT+1(EiT −AiT − Yik)|Ik
]
where all transactions after time k cancel out in expectations. Common information and beliefs,
and market clearing, then lead to the familiar first order conditions for equilibrium:
pk = E[pT+1|Ik]
ca(aik, θi) = θiaik = E[pT+1|Ik]
Because this was shown for an arbitrary k, we conclude that pt = E[pT+1|It] (and ait = ptθi ) for all
t. In particular, this implies that pt is a martingale: E[pt|It−1] = pt−1.
From the equilibrium at T + 1,
pt = E[pT+1|It] = K Pr(Z > 0|It) [16]
where, from the perspective of time t, Z is given by:









In expression (17), ek is normally distributed and pk is the result of normally distributed shocks and
can be approximated, from the perspective of time t, by the sum of normally distributed random
variables. Therefore Z|It is approximately normally distributed and thus pinned down by its mean
and variance, which we now derive.
Expression for E[Z|It]:
24
Taking expectations of (17) given It and applying the law of iterated expectations, we get:








Nµk − (T − t+ 1)pt
θ
i.e. (10). For future reference, we note that this implies that E[Z|It] takes the following recursive
form:












Expression for V [Z|It]:
To derive the expression for the variance, we again use an induction argument and the expression
derived for E[Z|It]. Suppose that (11) holds for all t > l. From the law of total variance,

































xl+1 − (T − l)pl+1θ |Il
)
From the perspective of time l, pl+1 is a function of xl+1 and el which we denote fl+1(xl+1, el).
Linearizing this function around the expectations of its two arguments and accounting for the fact



























































as claimed, or equivalently and for future reference:
V (Z|Il) = E [V (Z|Il+1)|Il] +Nσ2
(






Putting the expression for E[Z|Il] and V [Z|Il] together with (16) yields (9).
The last step in the proof is to check for uniqueness (existence follows directly from Brouwer’s fixed
point theorem on the domain [0,K]). We first show that V (Z|It) is fully pinned down by E[Z|It].
Intermediary step: V (Z|It) is fully pinned down by E[Z|It].
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The proof proceeds by induction. The claim holds for V (Z|IT−1) as shown in the proof of Lemma
3 (and trivially so for V (Z|IT )). Suppose it also holds for all t > l. Let ht(.) describe the function
that maps E[Z|It] into V (Z|It) for t > l i.e. V (Z|It) = ht(E[Z|It]). Then (20) can be rewritten as:
V (Z|Il) = E [hl+1(E[Z|Il+1])|Il] +Nσ2
(










changes with el, evaluated at xl+1 = Nµl+1 and el = E[el|Il]. Applying the implicit function
theorem to (9) to obtain an expression for ∂∂el fl+1(Nµl+1, E[el|Il]) and rearranging, we get that :(


















evaluated at xl+1 = Nµl+1 and el = E[el|Il] and the corresponding equilib-
rium price. Since, by assumption, V (Z|Il+1) is fully pinned down by E[Z|Il+1] and E[Z|Il+1] =
E[Z|Il] at xl+1 = Nµl+1 and el = E[el|Il] (no new information), then (22) is fully pinned down by
E[Z|Il] (and the knowledge of the model parameters, K, θ, N , T and σ2).
We now turn to the first term of the righthand side of (21). The martingale property of expected
excess emissions, (18), implies that E [hl+1(E[Z|Il+1])|Il] can be rewritten as










xl)− (T − l)
θ
(pl+1 − pl)
is approximately normally distributed from the perspective of time l, with E[∆l+1|Il] = 0 and




, a function of E[Z|Il] (following the same arguments as above).
Therefore, E [hl+1(E[Z|Il+1])|Il] depends both directly, as an argument in hl+1, and indirectly,
through the distribution of ∆l+1, on E[Z|Il].
Uniqueness of equilibrium price:
A sufficient condition for the equilibrium price to be unique is that the righthand side of (9) is
decreasing in pt, or equivalently, that
E(Z|It)√
V (Z|It)
is decreasing in pt. Leveraging the intermediary step,

























































From Lemma 2, we know that δT (wT−1) is strictly bounded between 0 and 1, and likewise, we
established in Lemma 3 that ∂∂wT−1
wT−1√
hT−1(wT−1)
> 0 for all wT−1 when N is large enough, which
implies (from (26)) that δT−1(wT−2) is also strictly bounded between 0 and 1. Referring back to
(25), this implies that hT−2(wT−2) scales up with N (denoted hT−2(wT−2) = O(N)).
Define the function gt(wt, N) =
wt√
ht(wt,N)
(where with a slight abuse of notation we have made
explicit the dependence of ht on N). When t = T − 2, this function scales with N 12 since its
numerator scales with N and we have just established that its denominator scales with N
1
2 . Let’s
rewrite wt = Nwt to highlight the dependence of the numerator on N . Taking the total derivative
of gT−2(wT−2, N) with respect to N , this means that, for wT−2 > 0 (the argument is symmetric for
wT−2 < 0) and N large enough:
d
dN






gT−2(wT−2, N) > 0
Because the second term is negative, we can conclude that
∂
∂wT−2







for N large enough. We can apply this argument recursively to establish that (24) holds for all
t.
Proof of Corollary 1. The corollary follows directly from (18) and (20).
Proof of Corollary 2. Corollary 2 follows directly from a linearization of (9) around xt = Nµt
and et−1 = E[et−1|It−1].
Proof of Theorem 2. From equation (9), market participants can infer E(Z|It)√
V (Z|It)
from the obser-
vation of the price. Moreover, the argument establishing the uniqueness of the equilibrium price
in the proof of Theorem 1 established that E[Z|It]√
V (Z|It)
is strictly increasing in E[Z|It]. Therefore,
E[Z|It] and V(Z|It) are separately identified from the observation of equilibrium prices. These are
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also sufficient statistics for Z conditional on It. Therefore, E[pT+1|Iit] = E[pT+1|It] for all i and
market participants minimize their expected compliance costs at the full information equilibrium
actions.
Proof of Theorem 3. We show that the solution {aFB1t ,.., aFBit , .., aFBNt }Tt=1 to the dynamic ag-
gregate cost minimization problem is identical to the abatement decisions arising in the market
equilibrium.
At time T + 1, emissions and abatements are fixed so there is no decision to take. Either
cumulative aggregate emissions are higher than cumulative abatement, in which case a penalty
of K per missing allowance is imposed, or ET ≤ AT , in which case no further cost is incurred.
Therefore, at time T + 1, aggregate abatement costs are equal to max {K (ET −AT ) , 0}.





c(aiT , θi) + E [max {K (eT + ET−1 − aT −AT−1) , 0} |IT ] [27]
Let ϕ(.|IT ) denote the pdf of eT , the only variable that is not known with certainty in (27), condi-





c(aiT , θi) +K
∫ ∞
aT+AT−1−ET−1
(eT + ET−1 −AT )ϕ(eT |IT )deT






ϕ(eT |IT )deT = 0















Comparing this expression with the equation characterizing the competition market equilibrium (1)
and (4), we conclude that aFBiT is the same as the abatement decision that arises in the market
equilibrium, conditional on being in the same situation, i.e. past abatement and past realized
emissions being the same.
The rest of the proof proceeds by induction. Suppose that the first best levels of abatement for
period t + 1 and above are identical to those arising in the market equilibrium and consider the

















where Z is defined by (2) as before, and ϕ(.|It) denotes its pdf, conditional on It. The first-order







Because, by assumption, aFBik is the same as in the market equilibrium for all k > t, then Z −
At−1 − Et−1|It has the same distribution as in the market equilibrium, Z − At−1 − Et−1|It ∼
N(E[Z|It]−At−1−Et−1, V [Z|It]), with E[Z|It] and V [Z|It] described by (10) and (11). Therefore,










and the claim follows from comparison with (9).
Proof of Lemma 4. At every integer time t, two sets of new information, {e1t−1, ..., eNt−1} and
{x1t, ..., xNt}, can be used to update firms’ prior beliefs about µ. Because the prior about µ and the
eit−1’s and xit’s are normally distributed, the posterior belief about µ is also normally distributed.
Let µ ∼ N(µt−1, τ2t−1), the period t− 1 posterior about µ. This means that beliefs about eit−1 and
xit at the end of period t − 1 are given by eit−1 = µt−1 + τt−1ηt + σνit−1 and xit = eit + εit =





























This means that the updated posterior belief about µ conditional on observing et−1N and
xt
N is
normally distributed with mean µt and variance τ
2
t given by (application of the projection theorem):
µt = µt−1 +
[
τ2t−1 τ2t−1





















































Therefore the updated belief about eit is distributed according to N(µt, σ
2
t ) with σ
2
t = σ
2 + τ2t .
Proof of Lemma 5. From the perspective of time t (and therefore knowledge of µt), individual
emissions at time k > t take the following form: eik = µt + ρ
∑k
l=t+1 ηl + σνik where ηl and νik are
i.i.d. N(0, 1). The claim follows directly.
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